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COMMENTS
DETERRING PLAYER HOLDOUTS:
WHO SHOULD DO IT, HOW TO DO IT,
AND WHY IT HAS TO BE DONE"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, major league professional team sports in North
America will be remembered as a time of widespread player mobility,
exponential player salary increases and incessant labor strife. These
three characteristics triggered a legitimate threat to the integrity of pro-
fessional sport, the player holdout. The holdout reflects the clash be-
tween the owner and his quest for long-term stability, against the
players' mission to be paid their current market value. Owners will sign
a marquee player to a long-term deal to please fans and promote team
stability. However, certain players elect to try and coerce ownership
into renegotiating existing contracts before the contractual term has ex-
pired. These players, usually perennial all-stars at the prime of their ca-
reers, will announce, likely during the off-season, that they will "hold
out" from training camp and the upcoming season unless their contract
is modified to reflect their "true value."' When negotiations reach a
stalemate, the player will follow through on his threat and refuse to par-
ticipate with the team. The holdout creates a media frenzy, upsets team
chemistry, alienates fans and damages the league's reputation. Some
holdout players return to action relatively quickly and cause only mini-
mal disruption but others miss substantial parts of the season, or even
the entire season.2
Alexei Yashin, star center of the Ottawa Senators of the National
Hockey League (NHL), unhappy with his $3.6 million annual contract,
- The author would like to thank Christine M. Harrington for her assistance in writing
this article.
1. This "true value" is what the player believes he is worth.
2. Associated Press, Yashin Loses First Arbitration Case vs. NHL (June 28, 2000), availa-
ble at http://espn.go.com/nhl/news/2000/0628/608595.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Yashin Loses]. See also ESPN.com news services, Devils Sign Deals with Arnott,
Niedermayer, at http://espn.go.com/nhl/nevs/2000/1119/890127.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001)
[hereinafter Devils] (announcing that the New Jersey Devils had come to terms with holdouts
Jason Arnott and Scott Niedermayer after the two star players missed ten regular season
games).
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held out of training camp and missed the entire 1999-2000 regular season
and playoffs.3 Yashin returned to the Senators on September 9, 2000
after an arbitrator refused to declare him a free agent.4 During the 1998-
1999 season, Yashin led the Northeast Division champion Senators with
44 goals and was a Hart Trophy finalist for the league's most valuable
player award.5
Yashin's hold out is the worst case scenario where the player misses
the entire season. Quite often a hold out will only last a few weeks.6
Nevertheless, holdout players do share certain common traits.
First, only superstar players have the leverage to stage a successful
holdout.7 These players are in high demand because of their exceptional
skills. The superstar, the coaching staff, the general manager and the
owner all understand that this player can shop around the league asking
almost any price.
Second, holdout players are often integral components of above-av-
erage teams and are usually coming off of a banner season where both
the team and the superstar had terrific performances. Yashin's 44 goals
and 50 assists during the 1998-1999 season, for example, set Ottawa
franchise records, while the team itself enjoyed success as Northeast Di-
vision champions.8 National Football League (NFL) running back Jamal
Anderson held out of the Atlanta Falcons' training camp after leading
them to Super Bowl XXXIII the previous season.9 Byron Dafoe, goal-
tender for the NHL's Boston Bruins, held out of training camp and
missed part of the regular season after backstopping the Bruins to the
second round of the playoffs in 1998-1999.1° Jason Arnott and Scott
3. Adrian Dater, Yashin Benched for Breach of Contract; Veteran Avs Players Side with
Senators, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at D-07, LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File.
4. ESPN.com news services, Yashin Barred from Becoming a Free Agent, at http:llespn.go.
comlnhl/news200010901/717134.html (Sept. 5, 2000) (last visited Feb. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
Yashin Barred]; ESPN.com news services, Yashin Rejoins Senators Without Remorse, at http://
espn.go.connhl/news12000109081729955.html (Sept. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Yashin Rejoins].
5. Wasted Time, SPORTNG NEws, Nov. 22, 1999, at 62, LEXIS, News Library, Tsn File;
Dater, supra note 3, at D-07.
6. Devils, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 8-10. See also Nancy Marrapese-Burrell, Hold-
ing Out Now an NHL Habit, ESPN.com news services (Sept. 11, 2000), at http://espn.go.com/
columns/marrapese-burrell nancy/734632.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
8. Associated Press, Senators Suspend Yashin for Season (Nov. 10, 1999), available at
http://espn.go.com/nhl/news/1999/1109/160875.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
9. Associated Press, Knee Injury Ends Anderson's Season (Sept. 22, 1999), available at
http:lfespn.go.comlnflnews/1999/092069142.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Knee
Injury].
10. ESPN.com news services, Dafoe Agrees to Deal With Bruins, at http://espn.go.com/nhl/
news/1999/1029/140263.html (Oct. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Dafoe].
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Niedermayer were both important members of the 2000 Stanley Cup
Champion New Jersey Devils. Conversely, owners do not demand re-
negotiation of a player's contract when the player has a sub-par season.
Third, holdout players generally have a negative impact on their
team. Ottawa did not repeat as Northeast Division champions and were
quickly eliminated in the first round of the Stanley Cup playoffs.1' At-
lanta went from Super Bowl finalist, to a 5-11 record and third place
finish in the National Football Conference (NFC) Western Division. 2
Boston failed to make the playoffs. 3 Although Dafoe only missed a
month of the season,'4 the goaltender did not play at the same level as
he did in 1998-1999.15
Fourth, holdout players create tension between leagues and player
unions. The NHL recently filed a grievance against the National Hockey
League Players Association (NHLPA) for allegedly violating the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by supporting Yashin's holdout.' 6 The NHL
also filed suit on behalf of the Senators requesting $7 million in damages
resulting from the financial detriment of Yashin's holdout.'7 This case
was settled on December 7, 2000.18
Finally, most holdout players often win big financially. Although the
player loses a considerable amount of playing time, a lucrative new con-
tract more than makes up for it.' 9
If the new contract is not profitable enough to justify holding out,
then the holdout player loses. However, in this scenario, no one else
really wins because both parties involved are injured irrespective of the
eventual outcome of the holdout. Fans lose the enjoyment of watching
the star player in action. Players lose the value of a teammate's talents.
The team loses focus on playing because of the publicity generated by a
hold out. Owners suffer because the player breached his contract and
11. See generally Tracy Huffman, FAN-TASTIC, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 25, 2000, at 1.
12. http://espn-nfll.factcity.net/factcity/espn-nfl (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
13. http://vvw.bostonbruins.com/history/1990s.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
14. Dafoe, supra note 10.
15. Pierre McGuire, In the Crease, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2000, at 83.
16. Associated Press, Yashin's Agent Scoffs at NHL's Grievance (Feb. 18, 2000), available
at http:llespn.go.com/nhl/news12000/0218/365072.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001) [hereinafter
Yashin's Agent].
17. Yashin Loses, supra note 2.
18. Associated Press, Senators Ask for Arbitration Case to be Dropped (Dec. 7, 2000),
available at http:l/espn.go.com/nhl/news/2000/1207I929381.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
19. Associated Press, Primeau Signs 5-year Deal with Flyers (Jan. 25, 2000), available at
http://espn.go.comnhl/news/20000123/309079.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Pri-
meau Signs].
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the owner is unable to provide the best product to the fans. The league
as a whole endures a considerable blow to its reputation. Player unions
are hurt because holdouts contribute to an atmosphere of distrust in the
labor arena. Furthermore, although easily overlooked, a holdout injures
society by suggesting that a person has no obligation to honor a commit-
ment when circumstances change.20 Society would be outraged, for in-
stance, if owners released a player and refused to honor their existing
obligations under a current and valid contract just because the player
happened to be performing poorly.
Although holding out is a product of free agency, it is not the prob-
lem here. Shopping one's talents around the free agent market looking
for the highest salary is neither novel nor inappropriate conduct. How-
ever, breaching a contract and demanding re-negotiation is unlawful and
improper. No one, including superstar athletes, should be above the
law."' Exceptional playing ability is no justification for a player to re-
nege on his obligations.
Since holdouts have numerous adverse effects, this trend must be
curbed before it spins out of control. This article discusses various ways
for fans, owners and leagues to strike back at a holdout player. Potential
fan action exists in various civil actions against the holdout player for
failing to perform a duty to the fans. The possibility of fan litigation
might deter players from holding out because these players would not
want to be mired in a plethora of legal actions. Possible owner claims
include requests for injunctive relief, which could enjoin a holdout
player from playing for another team until the contract term expires.
Injunctions have minimal deterrence value because a holdout player is
already willing to sit out part of a season to achieve their goals. Com-
missioners can fine or suspend a holdout, but cannot compel the player
to play. Player unions cannot reprimand the holdout player since they
have certain duties to all players in the league. Therefore, these injured
parties must join forces to corroborate on a solution. Fans cannot realis-
tically help, but owners, commissioners and player unions can attack the
20. Ottawa Senators' season-ticket holder Leonard Potechin, outraged at Yashin's despi-
cable attitude, was the first fan to take a stand against a holdout and he summarized what
many people thought but would not say when he stated "[w]hen Yashin said he could do
anything he wanted despite a valid contract, we [Potechin and his attorney] decided something
must be done." Lester Munson, Trashin' Yashin, SPORTS ILLUsTRATED, Jan. 17, 2000, at 30;
see infra text accompanying note 48.
21. Greg Joyce, McSorley Sparks Legal Debate, GLOBE & MArL (Toronto), Mar. 9, 2000,
at S6.
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driving force behind a holdout: the ability to become a free agent once
one's contract term expires.
This article will not focus on players who hold out after their contract
expires. Keith Primeau of the NHL's Carolina Hurricanes"2 and the Fal-
cons' Anderson recently held out not to re-negotiate an existing con-
tract, but to gain leverage in negotiating a new contract.a' This conduct
is the equivalent of talking to other teams as a free agent in an attempt
to gain leverage in contract negotiations.2 4 Dafoe, the Boston Bruin
holdout player mentioned earlier, chose this path in dealing with Boston
management.-5 The other category of holdouts, including Yashin and
NFL wide receiver Joey Galloway of the Seattle Seahawks, are players
who seek to renegotiate existing contracts, and these holdouts are a seri-
ous threat to the integrity of major league professional sport, and are the
topic of this article.
II. WHO CAN DETER HOLDOUTS AND WHY THEY CAN DO IT
A. Season-Ticket Holders/Non-Season-Ticket Holder Fans
1. Introduction
Contrary to the popular clich6, the game is not for the fans anymore.
Many of the parties in the upper echelon of professional sports appear
more than willing to alienate fans in order to further their own interests.
Owners charge high ticket prices and threaten to relocate. 6 Players ap-
pear, at times, to be playing for the paycheck and act like they are above
the law off the field.2 7 Leagues enter into television contracts with pro-
visions entailing that games will be blacked out unless a certain number
of (overpriced) tickets are sold.2" Granted, there are certain individuals
who place fans as the highest priority in sports, but they are a minority.
22. Primeau Signs, supra note 19. Primeau ended his five month holdout on January 25,
2001 by signing a five-year, $22.75 million contract with the Philadelphia Flyers.
23. Associated Press, Primeau,'Canes Appear Deadlocked (Dec. 28, 1999), available at
http://espn.go.comlnhl/news/1228/255939.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001); Knee Injury, supra
note 9.
24. Players hold out after their contract expires hoping to create a sea of controversy in
which fan and media pressures force the owner to give in to their demands.
25. Dafoe, supra note 10.
26. See, e.g., Link Doesn't Exist Between Rising Salaries, Ticket Prices, SEATrLE Tmms,
Apr. 5, 1999, at E2, LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File.
27. Professional athletes' run-ins with the authorities are far too numerous to cite in this
paper.
28. See generally Blaich v. Nat'l Football League, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
United States v. Nat'l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953); PAUL C. WEILER &
2001]
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A player holdout is a slap in the face of the fans who are important
contributors to the player's economic and emotional success. Fans pay
for tickets to the games, buy a jersey with the player's name on the back
and cheer until they are hoarse. They are rewarded by the holdout
player who refuses to play and perform for his fans. While the average
season-ticket holder or casual fan goes to work day in and day out, the
holdout player sits at home and waits to sign a lucrative contract.
Fans, who are admittedly in a position of dependence, cannot rely on
owners or leagues to protect their interests because these entities are
severely limited by their own self-interests. Owners do not want to
spend too much money on a holdout player since it may open a "Pan-
dora's Box" by encouraging future would-be holdouts. Leagues already
have a very fragile labor relationship with the unions, so their hands are
somewhat tied. Regrettably, although fans have shown the initiative to
take action, they are not in a position to make a difference. This section
outlines certain legal and non-legal means available for fan action
against a holdout player and concludes that any such efforts would be
futile.
2. Non-Legal Courses of Action: Boycotts
Ironically, in light of the weaknesses that will be described infra, fans
played an integral role in the modernization of major league professional
sports in North America. Fan interest catalyzed new stadium construc-
tion, the progression of all-sport cable television networks, owner's eco-
nomic prosperity and, indirectly, the exponential growth in player
salaries.2 9 Logically, fans should be able to influence owner and player
behavior by refraining from attendinpg games and refusing to watch
games on television or listen to them on the radio.30
Boycotts would require local media support. Negative publicity,
complemented by fan protests31 and demonstrations, along with radio
and television depictions of the dishonest holdout player might deter
other players who may be contemplating a holdout in the near future. In
GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 549-92 (2d ed. 1998); Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust
Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463 (1990).
29. 1 MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMEs T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRAcrIcE § 10.06 (1)(c), at
957 (2d ed. 1998).
30. L. Patrick Auld, Ownership Control Over Professional Sports Teams' Payrolls: Could
Anyone Have Stopped Tom Werner from Dismantling the San Diego Padres?, 12 U. M__rVU
Er. & SPORTS L. REv. 129, 133-34 (1994-95).
31. Fans in San Diego, for instance, protested inside and outside of Jack Murphy Stadium
after Padres' ownership traded or released ten quality players. See Dave Sheinin, Fire Sale in
San Diego Leaves Players, Fans Steaming, WASH. POST, July 5, 1993, at C1.
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an ideal world, the possibility of a fan boycott would deter players from
holding out because if athletes alienate their fans, they are eliminating
their meal ticket. If fans do not financially support the team, owner and
league revenue decreases and player salaries shrink. However, although
the boycott and mass protest seems like an ideal solution, any possible
effectiveness is unrealistic.
First and foremost, a boycott will probably hurt the owner more than
the player because reduced attendance lowers owner revenue, and the
holdout player will end up signing somewhere else because his original
team cannot afford him.
Second, a total boycott is difficult to organize and implement. With
the increased access to games on television, superstar athletes are no
longer merely celebrities in their home cities: they have fans across
North America. These fans might root for their local team but also fol-
low the league in general, and would, therefore, not have any interest in
a boycott. They might even support the player's decision to hold out.
Moreover, boycotting would be economically harmful to the city's team.
For example, if hockey fans in Toronto refused to watch Maple Leafs-
Senators games because Yashin was holding out, the boycott would harm
the Leafs as well as the Senators because television ratings would de-
crease and sponsors might not renew the teams' contracts.
Third, a group boycott is a desperate measure considering the unique
nature of the professional sports industry. There are no reasonable sub-
stitutes for major league professional sports.32 Some fans simply would
not be able to justify paying such a severe price simply because the team
is missing an important player. Senators hockey, for instance, remained
entertaining even without Yashin on the ice.
Finally, even should a boycott materialize, its economic impact will
be minimal. Local fan attendance is insignificant to the overall economic
prosperity of a professional sports team. Teams have fixed revenues
through television and radio contracts, food and merchandise agree-
ments and, in some leagues, prosperous revenue sharing.33 If a boycott
lasted two or three years, perhaps revenues from television, radio and
concession deals would diminish, but the potential for a long-term boy-
cott is not promising. Additionally, a league-,ide boycott would never
materialize. Thus, although fans arguably possess power in the profes-
32. Auld, supra note 30, at 135.
33. 1997 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASIC AGREEMENT art. XXV [hereinafter
MLBBA]; 1995 NATIONAL HocKEY LEAGUE COLLECrrVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 28
[hereinafter NHLCBA].
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sional sports industry, the threat of a fan boycott will not deter a player
from holding out.
3. Legal Courses of Action
a. Contract Law
The elements of a valid contract are an offer, acceptance and consid-
eration.34 Casual fans, who do not hold season-tickets to the games, cer-
tainly do not have any type of enforceable contract. Season-ticket
holders, although they can rationally assert that they entered into a con-
tractual relationship with the owner and the team when they purchased
the season-ticket package, cannot reasonably argue that a player is privy
to this contract. This section outlines the ineffectiveness of a fan con-
tract action against an owner and the inability of a fan contract action
against a holdout player.
Historically, courts do not classify a season-ticket package, which in-
cludes tickets, parking and a personal seat license, as a valid contract
between the season-ticket holder and the team. Certain courts hold that
a season-ticket is a license 35 and revocable as long as the revocation is
not based upon a discriminatory reason infringing upon a person's civil
rights.3 6 An Ohio appellate court did consider a season-ticket package
as a contract because all of the requirements of a contract- offer, accept-
ance and consideration- were met.37
The Court of Appeals of Texas recently adjudicated various claims
brought by Dallas Cowboys' season-ticket holders, including a claim for
breach of contract.3 1 The court's opinion specifically notes during its dis-
cussion of the breach of contract allegation that "the Cowboys conclude
34. CLAUDE D. ROHWER & GORDON D. SCHABER, CONTRA= IN A NUTSHELL 8 (1997).
35. Soderholm v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that a ticket "grants the licensee a right to enter upon the licensor's land and
use it for a specific purpose, without giving up the licensor's legal possession and control over
the property."); Walsh v. St. Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, Inc., 822 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992) (recognizing that a game ticket grants a revocable license to enter property). See
also Stern v. Cleveland Browns Football Club, Inc., No. 95-L-196, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS
5802, at *16 (Dec. 20, 1996) (reversing trial court and holding that Browns' season-ticket
holder held only a revocable license); Pace v. Cleveland Browns Football Club, Inc., No. 95-L-
195, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5798, at *11 (Dec. 20, 1996); Reed v. Cleveland Browns Football
Club, Inc., 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5797, at *9-10 (Dec. 20, 1996) (holding that there was no
contract between season-ticket holder Reed and the Browns).
36. Bickett v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (App. Div. 1983).
37. Beder v. Cleveland Browns, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 716, 720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
38. Chaussee v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 05-96-00429-CV, 1997 Tex. App.
LEXIS 6143, at *10 (Dec. 2, 1997) (mentioning specific "contractual obligations" of the Cow-
boys toward the season-ticket holders).
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that they have not breached their contractual obligations [to the season-
ticket holders] under the seat options. '39 The Cowboys admitted there
was a contract between the team and season-ticket holders.4"
Not only will prospective season-ticket holder plaintiffs have the bur-
den of proving that there is a valid contract, they also must show a mate-
rial breach of this contract. Courts appear unwilling to punish team
owners for circumstances beyond their control, such as a player
holdout.4 In this respect, the season-ticket holder "assumes the risk"
that that the team will field a particular product and cannot complain
when unforeseeable events downgrade that product. In other words, a
reasonable season-ticket holder should recognize that there are certain
circumstances, beyond anyone's control, that may influence the value of
the season-ticket package: holdouts, trades, retirements and injuries.42
On a similar note, certain courts hold that season-ticket holders "assume
the risk" that a team might relocate,43 that players may go on strike,' or
that owners may initiate a lockout.45 Therefore, only rarely will a sea-
son-ticket holder recover damages under a breach of contract claim for a
decline in the value of his tickets.46 Furthermore, damage recoveries
from owners or teams do not deter holdouts because holdout players are
not paying the awards.
It would be next to impossible to argue that there is a contract be-
tween a season-ticket holder and a player. Player contracts establish
contractual duties for a player to his team, but make no mention of any
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Owners sign players to long-term contracts to avoid the hassle of contract negotiations
and minimize personnel turnover. They reasonably believe that once a player signs a contract,
that player will perform the required obligations. Therefore, it is the contention of this author
that holdouts are beyond owner control.
42. Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 233, 238 (App. Div. 1978) (mention-
ing that since fan should have realized that Dr. J. might not have played for the Nets in the
upcoming season, he has no claim for diminished value of his ticket).
43. Charpentier v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 120 (Ct. App.
1999) (arguing that "plaintiff cannot reasonably claim the moving of the team itself broke any
promise").
44. Bickett, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48 (holding that Bills are excused from any nonperform-
ance of contractual obligations because they had no control over the 1982 player strike).
45. Although no one has argued that an owner lockout constitutes a breach of a season-
ticket contract, Bickett and Charpentier suggest that this argument would not pass muster.
46. Beder, 717 N.E.2d at 721; see also Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Sys. Inc., 22
F.3d 773, 774 (7th Cir. 1994). The court cleverly pointed out "that the Chicago Cubs turning
out to be the doormat of the National League would not entitle the ticket holder to a refund
for the remaining games, any more than the star tenor's laryngitis entitles the opera goer to a
refund when the understudy takes over the role." Id.
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obligations toward season-ticket holders or other fans.47 Even if a court
were to recognize this season-ticket holder-team contract, professional
athletes are not, and cannot, be held privy to this contract as this would
subject the player to seemingly endless liability. If such a contract ex-
isted, a season-ticket holder could theoretically sue a player under such
theories as lack of performance or lack of effort.
The Yashin situation represented the first time a fan sued a player for
breach of contract. The season-ticket holder and his lawyers quickly
came to their senses and dropped the claim, choosing to focus on various
tort allegations.48 Seeking remedies under tort law is a more appropriate
course of action for season-ticket holders who suffer injuries from a
player holdout.
b. Tort Law
The elements of a tort claim are duty, breach, causation and dam-
age.49 Fans, along with season-ticket holders, could better argue that
they have standing to sue in a tort action than in a contract action. The
basic argument is that the player had a duty to play for the team and
fans, that the player breached both of these duties by holding out, and
that the fan suffered damages because of this breach. However, as in
contract claims, courts are generally reluctant to find owners responsible
for circumstances that are largely beyond their control.50 "This section
will illustrate that tort actions, either against the team or the holdout
player, are ineffective deterrents to holdouts, because they are difficult
to prove.
Possible tort actions against the team include various theories of mis-
representation (fraud, false advertising), breach of warranty or breach of
fiduciary duty.5' Season-ticket holders could feasibly argue that they
were promised a certain product, but instead received an "arguably inad-
equate substitute."52 Recently, for example, outraged San Diego Padres'
and Florida Marlins' fans filed suit alleging, inter alia, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation and false advertising.53 In these cases, fans became
47. MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRAeICE 132-35 (1993).
48. Potechin v. Yashin, No. 99-CV-11500 CP (Ont. Sup. Ct. 2000), at http://www.sport-
slawnews.com/current/yashincasetext.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
49. DAN B. DOBs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000).
50. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
51. Auld, supra note 30, at 140.
52. Id. at 142.
53. Fans Sue Marlins Over Dismantling Team, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), May 19, 1998, at
D2, LEXIS, News Library, Comapp File; Karen Testa, Season Ticket Holders Sue, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, May 19, 1998, at 4D, LEXIS, News Library, Daydnw File; see also Memo Says
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incensed when owners slashed payrolls by releasing or trading marquee
players. Therefore, the season-ticket holders did not believe the owner
satisfied his duty of putting an entertaining and competitive product on
the field.54 Fans felt lied to because of the positive advertising and pro-
motional material sent to them during the off season suggesting that
their respective teams would be competitive in the upcoming season.
Fans also feel they have rights when a season is cut down by a player
strike. New York Yankees' fans filed suit alleging that the Yankees "led
fans down the garden path by selling advanced season tickets knowing
full well a players' strike was imminent."'56
These theories are feasible only if a court holds that an owner has a
duty to field the best possible team. Therefore, when the owner refuses
to renegotiate the salary of a potential holdout player, he or she
breaches that duty. The breach causes the fan to suffer from a dimin-
ished value of enjoyment.
Notwithstanding the feasibility of these claims, tort actions against
the team are useless deterrents. First, fan damage recoveries will not
deter future holdouts. A holdout player has no reason to even pay at-
tention to a lawsuit between a fan and his team. One exception could be
the possibility of the owner filing a claim naming the holdout player as a
third party defendant to provide contribution.
Second, just like when season-ticket holders attack an owner under a
breach of contract theory, most likely the result of the suit will punish
the team, not the player. If a team is ordered to pay significant damage
awards, they will have less money to spend on acquiring and resigning
players. On the other hand, the threat of a lawsuit may encourage the
owner to be more amiable to a holdout player's demands, and renegoti-
ate the contract in order to avoid being sued by the fans.
Fan tort action against the holdout player will also be fruitless, albeit
for different reasons. In the Yashin situation, season-ticket holder Leo-
nard Potechin pleaded numerous tort claims: intentional interference
with contractual relations, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty and negli-
Padres Will Offer Refunds, L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 1993, at C10, LEXIS, News Library, Lat File.
The Padres offered refunds to season-ticket holders who thought they were deceived by a
letter written by team president Dick Freeman indicating that the team planned to keep the
core of the team intact. Id. The outcome of the Marlins' suit is still unknown at this time.
54. See, e.g., Alan Snel, Huge Trade Presents Bigger PR Challenge, SUN-SENTEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 19, 1998, at IC, LEXIS, News Library, Sunsen File; Marlins' Season-Ticket
Holders Fight Back, TAMPA Tm., May 19, 1998, at 4, LEXIS, News Library, Tamtrb File.
55. Testa, supra note 53, at 4D.
56. New York, UPI, Aug. 10, 1981, LEXIS, News Library, UPI.
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gence.5 7 Justice Charbonneau of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
initially dismissed all allegations except the intentional interference with
contractual relations claim. 8 In his second ruling, Judge Charbonneau
dismissed the rest of the case.5 9
There were two main obstacles to Potechin's claim. First, the ele-
ments of an intentional interference with contract claim require that the
season-ticket holder and the team are parties to a valid contract.60 Sec-
ond, the primary motive behind holding out is money; interfering with
season-ticket holder-team contractual relations is incidental. 61 Season-
ticket holders will have difficulty proving that the holdout player in-
tended to cause a contractual breach. They might be better off going
after Yashin's agent for interfering with the contractual relationship be-
tween Yashin and the Senators since the agent might have exerted influ-
ence over Yashin's decision to hold out or might have failed to inform
Yashin of the consequences of a holdout. Regardless of whatever legal
action is endorsed, until a case on point is decided, we cannot reasonably
determine whether a professional athlete has an affirmative duty to sea-
son-ticket holders, fans, or both.
4. Conclusion
Boycotts, season-ticket contract actions and fan tort suits will not
work to deter holdouts. A boycott is too difficult to organize and would
barely make a chink in the armor of the sports industry. Contract and
57. Potechin, No. 99-CV-11500 CP, at http://www.sportslawnews.com/current/
yashincasetext.htm.
58. Id. The relevant test in Ontario for an intentional interference with a contractual
relations claim is
(1) an enforceable contract;
(2) knowledge of the plaintiff's contract;
(3) an intentional act on the part of the defendant to cause a breach of that contract;
(4) wrongful interference on the part of the defendant; and(5) resulting damage.
Ont. Store Fixtures Inc. v. Mmmuffins, Inc., 70 O.R.2d 42 (1989) (quoting Potechin v. Yashin,
No. 99-CV-11500 CP (Ont. Sup. Ct. 2000)).
59. Donna Casey, Judge Dismisses Fans' $2Z5M Lawsuit Against Senators' Holdout, OT-
TAWA SUN, May 12, 2000, at http://vww.canoe.ca/HockeyOttawa/mayl2_jud.html (last visited
July 12, 2000); Fans Suit Against Yashin Dismissed (May 11, 2000), at http:llvwvw.sportslawn-
ews.com/Archive/Articles%202000fYashinfanssuit.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
60. The prospects of a contract existing between the season-ticket holder and the team
was discussed supra Part II.A.3.a.
61. The court stated that "a generous reading of the statement of claim indicates that
although the real motive of the defendants' [Yashin and his agent] action was self-enrichment,
the target of the defendants' conduct was the season-ticket holder." Potechin, 99-CV-11500
CP, at http://www.sportslawnews.com/current/yashincasetext.htm.
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tort suits, even if they are heard by the courts, provide primarily money
damages that might make a few fans rich, but will not impact any future
player in his contemplation of a holdout.
B. Owners/Teams
1. Introduction
For people who believe that holdout players are victims, owners are
the scapegoats. Owners seem to take the blame for everything these
days. It is perhaps ironically fitting then, that owners have strong legal
arguments at their disposal should they decide to litigate against a
holdout player. In seeking redress, however, owners have various obsta-
cles standing in their way.
2. Legal Courses of Action
a. Contract Law
Owners clearly have an action for breach of contract. Yashin, for
example, agreed to a five-year contract, but refused to play his final year
when Ottawa would not renegotiate.62 This is a clear breach. A poten-
tial obstacle emerges in the arbitration clause of the standard player con-
tract. Under most professional athlete contracts in North America, all
disputes go to arbitration.63 The owner could argue that the contractual
provision is inapplicable since the player breached the contract and,
thus, waived the right to arbitration.
Greater stumbling blocks in reaching the ultimate goal of deterring a
holdout lie in the remedies involved. Neither a court nor an arbitrator
can order a player holding out to play.64 Therefore, just like in any fan
lawsuit, the holdout player is only going to be liable for money damages,
which this paper has already determined will be only a minimal
deterrent.
A final consideration is the damaging publicity of a lawsuit. Owners
who actually litigate against a holdout player risk alienating the fans,
discouraging players from signing with the team and generating a gener-
ally negative atmosphere surrounding the franchise.
62. Yashin Loses, supra note 2.
63. WALTER T. CHAMPION, SPORTS LAW 50 (1993).
64. Ordering an individual to play constitutes involuntary servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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b. Injunctive Relief
Owners, by seeking injunctive relief, will be able to preclude any
player who holds out from playing for another team until that player's
contract expires. Owners historically have prevailed in obtaining nega-
tive injunctions against players who breach an existing contract.65 Usu-
ally owners enter specific language into the contract detailing the
player's special and unique skills.6 The contractual provision entitles
the owner to injunctive relief, enjoining the player from playing for an-
other team should the player breach the contract.67 Filing injunctions
will deter holdouts, because, if players hold out, they will be unable to
play with any other team until their contract expires. Owners will proba-
bly wish to file a preliminary injunction in hopes that temporary relief
and punishment to the holdout player might persuade the player to re-
turn to action.68 Therefore, if a player has multiple years remaining on a
contract, he is unlikely to hold out when he knows that he would either
65. See generally Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870,882 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (granting
preliminary injunction enjoining defendant hockey player from playing for anyone but the
plaintiff team); Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506,517 (Ohio C.P.
[Cuyahoga County] 1961) (awarding injunctive relief because player had unusual skills and
talents and damages at law would be speculative and uncertain); Winnipeg Rugby Football
Club, Ltd. v. Freeman, 140 F.Supp. 365, 367 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (enjoining two players from
playing for the NFL's Cleveland Browns in breach of an ongoing contract with the Winnipeg
Rugby Football Club of the Canadian Football League (CFL)); Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v.
Lajoie, 51 A. 973, 976 (Pa. 1902) (granting injunction preventing superstar second baseman
Napoleon Lajoie from playing for anyone other than Philadelphia). Recently a Phoenix court
refused to grant an injunction allowing quarterback Keith Smith out of his CFL contract which
would have allowed Smith to play with a team in the Xtreme Football League (XFL). See
Dan Ralph, CFL Scores Legal Win over XFL, CAADiAN PREss, Dec. 20, 2000. Courts will
usually grant injunctive relief unless the owners themselves are also guilty of unlawful con-
duct. See New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291
F.2d 471,473, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1961) (refusing to grant injunction because "he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands"); Minnesota Muskies, Inc. v. Hudson, 294 F. Supp. 979,
990 (M.D.N.C. 1969) (refusing to grant injunction because plaintiffs interfered with player's
original contract). For other 'unclean hands' doctrine cases, see generally Los Angeles Rams
Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson,
186 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. La. 1960). But see Houston Oilers, Inc. v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.
1966) (declining to invoke the 'unclean hands' doctrine to refuse to grant the injunction).
66. See, e.g., Hudson, 294 F. Supp. at 982-83.
67. Id. at 983.
68. There are four elements applied to preliminary injunction hearings:
(1) likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm;
(3) balancing of the equities; and
(4) public interest at stake.
Boston Celtics Ltd. P'ship v. Shaw, 908 F.2d 1041,1048 (1st Cir. 1990); DAN B. DoBBs, REMr=-
DIES 108-11 (1984).
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have to rejoin his original team or wait on the sidelines until his contract
expires. The greater the ability to get an injunction, the greater the like-
lihood of an owner refusing to renegotiate with a holdout player. The
effectiveness of a negative injunction turns on whether the contract ex-
pires when the contract year ends regardless of whether the player par-
ticipates for that year, or if a contract period tolls until the player reports
back to the team.69
c. Tort Law
Owner tort actions against holdout players also raise the possibility
of alienating fans, who, at the end of the day, are the owner's true meal
ticket. Moreover, like a contract action, suing in tort WiU not affect the
owner-player contractual relationship. An owner may receive damages,
but will not get specific performance or nullification of the contract.
Even if a court of law is not precluded from hearing the case because of
a contractual provision in the player's contract,70 courts are often unwill-
ing to interfere in disputes involving members of a private association.7'
3. What Else Can an Owner Do?
If holdouts continue to be a problem, owners should refrain from
committing to long-term contracts. Although this would result in fewer
opportunities for holding out, it would greatly increase the free-agent
market. Choosing between having an absurd number of holdouts or an
outrageously large free-agent pool is choosing between two evils. Sus-
pending the player is useless since the player is already refusing to
play.72 Agreeing to a renegotiation clause in the player's contract puts
the owner at risk should the player's ability suffer a considerable drop-
69. For example, Yashin played four seasons under his five year contract. Yashin Loses,
supra note 2. Although the contract technically expired, Yashin owed another season to the
Senators according to the arbitrator. Yashin Rejoins, supra note 4.
70. CHAMPION, supra note 63, at 50.
71. See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., N.Y., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 414 (App. Div. 1962).
72. Player contracts have provisions granting the team authority to suspend the player for
conduct that is deemed detrimental to the club. The Senators, for instance, suspended Yashin
indefinitely after he failed to report to the team by November of the 1999-2000 season.
Yashin's Agent, supra note 16. The New York Rangers suspended defenseman Stephane
Quintal for the remainder of the 1999-2000 season for "conduct deemed detrimental to the
hockey club." Associated Press, Quintal's Season Ends on a Sour Note (Apr. 1, 2000), availa-
ble at http://espn.go.com/nhl/news/2000/0401/458886.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2001). The
Rangers suspended Quintal after he made remarks to a Montreal newspaper indicating his
desire to be traded back to the Canadians. lId
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off, and creates a greater likelihood of owner-player tension when it
comes time for the renegotiation.
4. Conclusion
The owners' best remedy is to file for injunctive relief. Although
they will not receive money damages, an injunction serves two important
purposes. First, it ends the controversy and allows the team to focus on
playing. Second, the injunction deters players from holding out because
if a court or arbitrator grants an injunction, the player will be unable to
play for anyone else. This would preclude the holdout player from forc-
ing a trade until the player's contract expires. Furthermore, players who
hold out will be forced to seriously consider the fact that they might not
get to play for a lengthy period of time. Tort suits, even though they may
provide monetary relief to the owner, are difficult to prove, expensive to
litigate and are not the long-term answer.
C. Internal Regulation
Commissioner discipline of a holdout player is certainly permissible
under the current structure of major league professional sports. In Ma-
jor League Baseball (MLB), for example, owners established the com-
missioner's office to ensure competitive balance, uphold the integrity of
the league and "to safeguard the public's interest in obtaining the best
possible sports product at the highest level of play governed by an objec-
tive third party."' 73 Additionally, league and commissioner power is de-
rived from the owners themselves.74 In fact, a commissioner who
abstains from disciplining a holdout player may be held liable for
breaching the common law league-franchise fiduciary relationship.75 If
the league is seen as a corporation, the commissioner is analogous to the
chairman of the Board of Directors and would have duties of diligence
and loyalty to the members of the corporation: the owners. Finally, play-
ers consent to commissioner authority by signing the uniform player con-
tract which legally binds the player and club to all the provisions of the
73. John K. Harris, Jr., Fiduciary Duties of Professional Team Sports Franchise Owners, 2
SaToN HALL J. SPORT L. 255, 259 (1992).
74. Id.
75. Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (Ct. App.
1983) (maintaining that, after reviewing a World Hockey Association league-franchise rela-
tionship, the directors and/or trustees owed duties of obedience, diligence, loyalty and good
faith).
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league constitution, league by-laws and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment (CBA).76
Disciplining holdout players internally through commissioner power
has four formidable obstacles. First, commissioners do not enjoy the
same powers as they did forty years ago.77 Extremely powerful and in-
fluential players' associations are a formidable obstacle. Unlike the
1950s and 1960s when leagues and teams did as they pleased, powerful
unions represent today's players.78 As one writer wrote concerning com-
missioner power in baseball, "his powers are hardly absolute. '79 An-
other writer argues that, in light of the restructuring of power in
baseball, "as far as labor relations are concerned, the commissioner's
best interest powers have all but vanished." 80
Second, commissioners do not have the final say in disciplinary pro-
ceedings because third party neutral arbitrators scrutinize their deci-
sions." The MLB CBA, for example, severely limits commissioner
authority by providing grievance procedures requiring disputes to go to
arbitration.82 Although courts traditionally give commissioners great
discretion to regulate internal conduct,83 arbitrators do not show similar
76. PAUL M. ANDERSON, SPORTS LAW: A DESKTOP HANDBOOiK 110 (1999).
77. See generally Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Pro-
fessional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete
Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REv. 1409 (1990).
78. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 29, at 959-61.
79. Michael Farber, The Man Who Would be Pope: Can the Commissioner's New Powers
Heal Baseball?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 31, 2000, at 27.
80. Ted Curtis, In the Best Interests of the Game: The Authority of the Commissioner of
Major League Baseball, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 33 (1995).
81. In the NBA, for instance, any player fined for more than $25,000 or disciplined to
"preserve the games integrity, or maintain public confidence in the game" may bring a griev-
ance in front of an arbitrator "mutually chosen by the league and the players association."
ANDERSON, supra note 77, at 107. See also 1999 NATIONAL BASKETBALL AssocIATION COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXXI [hereinafter NBACBA]; NHLCBA art. 17.
82. MLBBA art. XI.
83. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (noting that "the
commissioner is given almost unlimited discretion in the determination of whether or not a
certain state of facts creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball"). The
Kuhn court acknowledged that
[t]he Commissioner has general authority, without rules or directives, to punish both
clubs and/or personnel for any act or conduct which, in his judgment, is "not in the best
interest of baseball" within the meaning of the Major League Agreement. What con-
duct is "not in the best interests of baseball" is, of course, a question which addresses
itself to the Commissioner, not this court.
Id. at 1222.
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deference and they are rarely reversed by a court on appeal.84 An arbi-
trator, for instance, significantly reduced two recent high-profile suspen-
sions involving National Basketball Association (NBA) player Latrell
Sprewell and MLB pitcher John Rocker."
Third, since he arguably has no explicit authority to act, commis-
sioner action can be challenged on several grounds. Disciplining
holdout players is unprecedented. Since it is a novel area, it is unclear as
to what an appropriate punishment would be. Some might argue that a
commissioner has no authority to discipline a holdout player because it
is a contractual issue that should be ultimately resolved between the
holdout player and team and that disciplining holdout players is an
abuse of authority. A further option would be to challenge the discipline
on due process grounds.87
84. The traditional common law deference to arbitration awards emerged out of the Steel-
workers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In the sports context, the leading case illustrating
the court's refusal to overturn an arbitration award is Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615, 631 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to overturn
an arbitration award granting free agency status to baseball players McNally and
Messersmith).
85. National Basketball Players Ass'n on behalf of Latrell Sprewell & Warriors Basket-
ball Club and National Basketball Ass'n, Opinion and Award (1998) (arbitration hearing
before John D. Feerick); Associated Press, Braves Say They're Ready to Move On (Mar. 2,
2000), available at http:llespn.go.comlmlb/news/2000/0301/391897.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2001). Until 1994, the commissioner of Major League Baseball was the ultimate arbiter of
disputes. 1990 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BASic AGREEMENT, art. VII, 1. Moreover, clubs
waived any right of recourse in the courts. 1990 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL BAsIc AGREE-
MENT, art. VII, 2. The implementation of a third-party neutral arbitrator severely curbs com-
missioner authority in disciplining teams and players. The vast judicial precedent of courts
adhering to commissioner action is now moot since courts are now reviewing the award of an
independent arbitrator. For further discussion of the 'disempowered commissioner' in Major
League Baseball, see Jonathan M. Reisdorf, The Powers of the Commissioner in Baseball, 7
MARQ. SPORTs L.J. 211 (1996); Craig F. Arcella, Note, Major League Baseball's Dis-
empowered Commissioner: Judicial Ramifications of the 1994 Restructuring, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 2420 (1997).
86. For an overview of the debate over the limits of commissioner power see Matthew
Conway, Sports Commissioners or Judges: Who Should Make the Call When the Game is
Over?, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1043 (1990); Pachman, supra note 77.
87. Virgin v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 192 N.E.2d 414, 422-23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (holding
that for private associations, due process entails fundamental fairness, including good faith
proceedings, adherence to by-laws and procedures, a lack of prejudice or bias, notice to ac-
cused parties, and an opportunity to respond). The Florida Supreme court ruled that a court
would not interfere with the affairs of a private association unless the plaintiff could prove (1)
that the association acted with malice or bad faith; or (2) the association did not follow or
provide adequate and fair procedures. NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996). See also Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARo. SPORTS L.J.
167, 175-76 (1995).
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Fourth, punishing high-profile players (as most holdouts are) gener-
ates widespread public criticism. Commissioners and league presidents
of the four major sports increasingly struggle to find punishments that fit
the crime when disciplining today's players, coaches and teams. The me-
dia circus surrounding Sprewell's attack on coach P.J. Carlisemo and
Rocker's derogatory comments toward ethnic minorities show how the
commissioner as league disciplinarian is often left isolated while the per-
son being punished receives overwhelming support from the media, the
other players and the fans.88 Therefore, the commissioner is going to
take the likely public reaction into account before he decides to take
action, and will probably be influenced into giving a more lenient pun-
ishment or deciding not to act at all. While disciplining holdout players
does appear to be less controversial than the Sprewell and Rocker situa-
tions, commissioner action always sparks public debate and will con-
stantly be viewed under a microscope.
When all is said and done, an arbitrator will probably respect a com-
missioner's decision to discipline a holdout player. As long as the com-
missioner follows the requisite procedures, the holdout player will not be
able to raise a due process defense. Depending on the punishment, in-
ternal discipline may have an effect on future holdouts. However, since
commissioner action is imposed on a case-by-case basis, there is the pos-
sibility of inconsistent treatment of player holdouts. Therefore, the best
way of approaching the holdout problem is to implement changes in the
CBA.
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE MOST EFcErivE MEANS OF
DETERRING HOLDOUTS
A. Why Rule Changes are Necessary
Injunctive relief or commissioner discipline are solutions limited to
the specific case that they apply to. While these courses of action will
provide at least minimal precedent for future cases or arbitration hear-
ings, they do not set forth a clear principle of law. Rule changes estab-
lish clear ground rules and could help deter holdouts in two ways.
First, a new by-law, constitutional amendment or CBA provision giv-
ing the commissioner explicit authority to discipline holdout players
88. See, e.g., Rod Beaton, Rocker Returns with Scoreless Inning for Braves, USA TODAY,
Apr. 19, 2000, at IC, LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy File; Sprewell Knows 2nd Chances, USA
TODAY, Dec. 29, 1999, at 10C, LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy File; The Ruling, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1997, at C6, LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File; The Vent, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 11, 2000, at 2E, LEXIS, News Library, Atljnl File.
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removes any doubt over whether disciplining holdout players is within
the scope of commissioner power. Commissioners will then be able to
take swift action when a player begins a hold out. The new rule might
proscribe the amount of time the league should await until imposing
discipline.
Second, the new rule could specifically define a holdout player's sta-
tus with regards to free agency. The new by-law, constitutional amend-
ment or CBA provision would state that players who do not honor
contracts cannot be granted free-agency status until they honor their ex-
isting contract. Since the threat of leaving the team via free agency is an
important bargaining chip for players, they might refrain from holding
out since their only way to gain free-agency status would be to start play-
ing again and finishing the existing years of their contract. In other
words, players who hold out have their contracts tolled until they return
to action. This is a clause in the NFL collective agreement.8 9 Although
the NHL CBA had no similar provision, arbitrator Lawrence Holden
ruled that Yashin owed the Senators another year of service before he
could attain free agency status.90 The NHL won at arbitration, but the
league, along with MLB and the NBA need to follow the NFL's example
and specifically prohibit holdout players from becoming free agents.
B. Why Rule Changes Should be Implemented Through
Collective Bargaining
A rule change stating guidelines for commissioner discipline of
holdout players should not trigger any substantial labor strife. Even if
the owners fail to implement this provision, the commissioner will still
have his "best interest of the game" authority.9'
However, changing free agency rules will probably generate signifi-
cant controversy, whether the changes are unilaterally implemented or
whether leagues and owners choose to engage in collective bargaining to
try and achieve their means. Under the first scenario, if leagues and
owners were to unilaterally change by-laws without consulting the play-
ers' unions, their action can and will be invalidated as an antitrust viola-
89. 1995 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE BARGANING AGREEMENT art.
XVIII l(b) [hereinafter NFLCBA].
90. NHL Scores Major Victory in Yashin Arbitration (June 29, 2000), available at http://
www.sportslawnews.com/current/Yashinloses.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001); Yashin Loses,
supra note 2. On appeal, the court affirmed the arbitration decision; Yashin Barred, supra
note 4.
91. Curtis, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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tion.92 On the other hand, under the second scenario, if the leagues and
owners were to bring this issue to the bargaining table, they run the risk
of a work stoppage. This latter option, however, represents the most
effective deterrent to holdouts because in this context, leagues and own-
ers are better off with labor law governing professional sports rather
than antitrust law.
Free agency restrictions are arguably a restraint of trade and a viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act.9 3 Labor law, however, trumps anti-
trust law if certain conditions exist.94 As long as the alleged restraint of
trade is a product of bona fide collective bargaining, courts will recog-
nize the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust.95 Further, some
courts hold that the exemption applies even after collective bargaining
reaches an impasse.96 Labor laws, therefore, weaken individual players
bargaining power. However, since labor law preempts antitrust, labor
law "makes the [CBA] the supreme governing authority regarding the
terms and conditions of employment.... [and] precludes an employer
from changing those terms and conditions without engaging in collective
bargaining."97
Turning to the facts of the first scenario presented earlier, unilateral
league/owner action changing free agency rules would face two formida-
ble obstacles. First, the conduct is an outright violation of the labor laws
because the changes were not implemented through collective bargain-
ing. Second, the changes will be subject to antitrust attack since they are
not the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining. Labor law policy
only protects the bilateral management-labor relationship. Leagues and
92. See sources cited infra notes 94-98.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
94. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965)
(holding that collective bargaining under the labor laws preempts conflicting antitrust policy).
95. See, e.g., Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir. 1989) (allowing
the NFL to invoke the exemption where there has been an agreement between management
and labor); Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987); Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614-16 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that "the policy favoring collec-
tive bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where
the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining");
Bridgeman v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964-67 (D.N.J. 1987); see generally
Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DuXcn L.J. 339
(1989).
96. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (affirming court of
appeals decision holding that players may not claim fixed salary imposed by the NFL is an
antitrust violation even though negotiations had reached an impasse); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n
v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that non-statutory labor exemption
precludes antitrust attack despite impasse in negotiations).
97. Stiglitz, supra note 87, at 173.
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owners cannot argue the changes as acceptable on commissioner author-
ity grounds because commissioner power cannot conflict with the CBA.
By now it is obvious that the CBA governs labor relations in profes-
sional sport. The dominance of the CBA in the current labor structure
of major league professional sports protects holdout player conduct.
First, CBAs do not expressly authorize the commissioner to take discipli-
nary action against a holdout player. Second, CBA language governs
free agency rules that provide the motivation for the holdout. 98 Third,
owners cannot unilaterally amend the CBA until an impasse in bargain-
ing occurs.9 9 The labor agreements in baseball, football and basketball
all contain language that serve to prevent a player from getting around a
contract by sitting out.100 Since changing free agency requirements
would be the strongest deterrent to holdouts, the NHL would have to
put the proposed changes on the bargaining table, declare an impasse,
unilaterally implement the proposal and hope that a court or arbitrator
will follow Brown' and rule that the labor exemption extends beyond
impasse. Meanwhile, the proposal might spark such tension that a work
stoppage would be inevitable. This risk is always present during collec-
tive bargaining. Additionally, perhaps the players' union would be sym-
pathetic toward the proposal. Holdouts can be detrimental to other
players by aggravating owners and discouraging them from entering into
long-term contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
All holdout players, even those who return to the team after one day,
feel their contract should be renegotiated to reflect salary market
changes in their respective sport. Yet, a changing market effects daily
life, not only sports, and ordinary citizens do not renege on a contract
when circumstances change. In fact, your boss is probably not going to
reduce your salary because the firm has a rough month.
Holdouts harm numerous parties inside and outside of the sport in-
dustry. Additionally, under the status quo, players have and will con-
tinue to get away with this. Fan or owner lawsuits are only temporary,
case-specific solutions. Commissioner power does not include the au-
thority to discipline players who hold out. Even if a commissioner took
action under the catch all "best interests" provision, discipline would be
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imposed on a case-by-case basis. Unlike unique situations of a player
choking his coach or a player making disgraceful derogatory remarks,
the holdout is absolutely capable of repetition. Moreover, holdouts have
become so numerous and frequent so that a case-by-case approach is
impracticable and a drain of resources. Collective bargaining, therefore,
is the means to reach the end of the elimination of the player holdouts.
Since players obviously are unwilling to fulfill their valid contractual ob-
ligations, this new CBA language must make holding out wholly undesir-
able. Then no player in his right mind will try to be "above the law" and
will simply go out and play the game.
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